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Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School




By any measure, Derrick Bell is a man of great distinction.'
After an illustrious career as a civil rights litigator, he joined the
faculty of the Harvard Law School, received tenure, and taught
courses on constitutional law for eleven years. Professor Bell has
also taught at the University of Washington, Emory University,
University of Illinois, and Florida State University. In 1980, the
University of Oregon selected him to serve as the dean of its law
school. Professor Bell is also the author of a leading text in civil
rights law2 and of numerous highly acclaimed scholarly articles, 3
including the Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's survey of
the Supreme Court's 1984 term4-- one of the most prestigious pub-
lications for a constitutional law article.
Professor Bell accepted an invitation to teach Constitutional
* J.D., Yale Law School 1975, Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law
School. I am indebted to Professor Gerald Torres of the University of Minnesota
Law School for his valuable ideas and comments.
1. The following account of the events that transpired at Stanford Law School
is based upon an article written by Professor Bell, published in a law student news-
paper by the Stanford Law Association. See Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of
Racial Perspective, Stan. L. Sch. J. 5 (1986). (A copy of Professor Bell's article is on
file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice.) I have also spoken
by telephone to several persons about these events, including Professor Gerald
Torres of the University of Minnesota Law School and Professor Bell himself, who
has returned to Harvard Law School.
2. See infra note 28.
3. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Con-
vergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980); Derrick Bell, Humanity in Legal
Education, 59 Or. L. Rev. 243 (1980); Derrick Bell, A Holiday for Dr. King: the Sig-
nificance of Symbols in the Black Freedom Struggle, 17 U.C.D. L. Rev. 433 (1984);
Derrick Bell, An American Fairy Tale: the Income-Related Neutralization of Race
Law Precedent, 18 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 331 (1984); Derrick Bell, A Hurdle too High:
Class-Based Roadblocks to Racial Remediation, 33 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1984); Derrick
Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still White
Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 385 (1986).
4. Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1985).
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Law at Stanford Law School for the 1986 spring semester. At
Stanford, Constitutional Law is a required course for first-year stu-
dents. Professor Bell used a text co-authored by Stanford profes-
sor Paul Brest-a book also used in the other two Constitutional
Law sections.
Based on the belief that Professor Bell was placing too much
emphasis on issues of race and slavery, a number of white students
in Professor Bell's course questioned his competence early in the
semester. Even though the text assigned to the class was clear on
the importance of race and slavery in the formulation of constitu-
tional doctrine, it did not prevent Proefssor Bell's students from
complaining to other professors about "balance" in Professor Bell's
teaching. In response to these complaints, a few faculty members
organized a series of "enrichment lectures" to "supplement" Pro-
fessor Bell's teaching. The lectures were canceled after Stanford's
Black law student organization protested. None of the professors
participating in the lecture series thought to discuss the matter of
"balance" in Professor Bell's teaching of Constitutional Law with
Professor Bell. Worse yet, Professor Bell was invited to give one
of the lectures, and had agreed to do so, without being informed of
the real purpose behind the lecture series. Professor Bell appar-
ently was invited in an attempt to allay any suspicion on the part
of either Professor Bell or the law school community.
The reaction of the white law professors to the student com-
plaints about Professor Bell's teaching was a radical departure
from the manner in which law students' complaints about teaching
are routinely handled.5 More importantly, the reaction by Profes-
sor Bell's colleagues, as well as the response of disgruntled stu-
dents to Professor Bell's teaching, illustrates a particular type of
racial perception. I call this racial state of mind an "anti-minority
mindset."
By "anti-minority mindset" I mean a predisposition to assess
minority performance in a negative or hypercritical fashion, an in-
tolerance for even small mistakes committed by minorities, a pro-
clivity toward denying minorities the deference or presumption of
competence normally accorded to white male law professors. An
anti-minority mindset, in short, is a set of negative biases held
5. Especially in first-year courses-when the use of casebooks, Socratic teach-
ing styles, and pressures to excel at times make it difficult to adjust to the study of
law-the usual practice is to urge disgruntled students to be patient or to talk the
matter over with the professor teaching the course. In Professor Bell's case, the
latter approach would not have been a problem because Professor Bell enjoys a
reputation of being accessible to students.
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against minorities either consciously or unconsciously. 6
Recent studies show that something more than an anti-mi-
nority, as well as an "anti-feminist," mindset-namely, racism and
sexism-can be found in many areas of professional life.7 Yet it is
6. I witnessed anti-minority feelings in a Lamaze childbirth class I attended
not long ago. During this class, a film on labor and delivery was shown to about a
dozen couples, most of whom were white. The film traced the experiences of two
couples, one white and the other Black, as they went through labor and delivery.
The white mother experienced much discomfort and had to use an oxygen mask.
As a result, the fetus was under constant distress, shown by its color and muscle
tone after delivery. Throughout the labor and delivery, the father became increas-
ingly intense and made a number of demands on the nurses in a highly excited
manner. The Black mother experienced little discomfort, although she had a
slightly longer labor period, and joked with her husband about "going partying" af-
ter the delivery. The husband was also relaxed. He made no demands on the
nurses. At the end of the film, several white couples in the class made similar com-
ments: The white parents seemed to be in control and appeared to know what they
were doing throughout the labor and delivery. The white parents were serious, and
asserted their "rights." The Black parents were perceived to be out of control and
unaware of what they should be doing-they were awkward, joked too much, made
no attempt to demand their "rights," and so on. As these comments began to accu-
mulate, the Lamaze instructor, who was also white, stepped in to offer her assess-
ment of the film. The white parents, she said, were not in control. They were
tense, the mother did not handle her pain well, the breathing and coaching were
not good (hence the need of the oxygen mask for the mother), the baby had poor
color and muscle tone, and there was much doubt in the moments after delivery
whether the baby would live (hence the somber mood of the doctors and nurses in
the delivery room). In contrast, the Black parents experienced an easy labor and
delivery. They were in control, relaxed, joked a great deal, the baby had good color
and muscle tone, and the liveliness of the delivery room reflected the medical
staff's confidence in the delivery. Anti-minority, or anti-Black, feelings, I believe,
were behind the class' negative and erroneous assessment of the Black parents.
7. Recent studies have reached the conclusion that racism and sexism are still
impediments in the professonal lives of minorities and females. The best statistical
and testimonial study of the subject may be John Fernandez, Racism and Sexism in
Corporate Life (1981). See also Glegg Watson & George Davis, Black Life in Corpo-
rate America (1982); Progressive Report on the Black Executive: the Top Spots Are
Still Elusive, Bus. Wk., Feb. 20, 1984, at 104; William A. Henry, III, Double Jeop-
ardy in the Newsroom, Time, Nov. 29, 1982, at 90; Richard Levine, The Plight of
Black Reporters: Why Unconscious Racism Persists, TV Guide, July 25, 1981, at 22.
The United States Civil Rights Commission has issued a report concluding that af-
firmative action is often the only way to overcome entrenched "institutional dis-
crimination" against job applicants on the basis of race or sex. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
13, 1981, Section 4 (Week in Review) at 2, col. 2. The Supreme Court has similar
views of affirmative action; see, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct.
1442, 1451 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3036-37 (1986). Cf. James Smith and Finis Welch, Closing
the Gap: Forty Years of Economic Progress for Blacks xxi (1986) (a study done for
the U.S. Department of Labor by the Rand Corporation in which the authors con-
clude that affirmative action has "resulted in a radical reshuffling of [B]lack jobs in
the labor force," especially toward "managerial and professional jobs."). On the
specific issue of the anti-feminist mindset, see, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 16,
col. 3 (a review of Peter Hartz, Merger: The Exclusive Inside Story of the Bendix-
Martin Marietta Takeover War (1985) in which the reviewer, Tim Metz, a news edi-
tor of the Wall Street Journal, discussed the "anti-feminist passions" of some Mar-
tin Marietta directors). Charles E. Silberman in A Certain People: American Jews
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still not easy for the victims of an anti-minority or anti-feminist
mindset to pinpoint the existence of these mindsets in a manner
that is sufficiently "objective" or "conclusive" for many white
men. Even in Professor Bell's situation-where the incompetence
of a Black faculty member is so presumed that the word of white
first-year law students is given more weight than that of a former
dean and Harvard law professor-some white males might be in-
clined to dismiss any claim of anti-minority mindset as "wild spec-
ulation" while others might call it "overreaction."
My ambition for this article is threefold. First, I will attempt
to state the case for what I suspect most minority law professors
already believe or know to be so-namely, that an anti-minority
mindset exists among some white law professors who are called
upon to evaluate minority candidates for appointment, promotion,
and tenure. This discussion will take place in part I of the article.
In part II, I will examine the substance of an anti-minority
mindset. Important questions to consider include: Is an anti-mi-
nority mindset simply a form of white "racism"? Or, is it race-
neutral-perhaps something that minorities might feel or think if
they were the majority group in this country? Through discussion
of several more specific types of racial mindsets-"racial formal-
ism" (or "simple racism"), "racial subordination" (or "complex ra-
cism"), and the "white self-interest phenomenon" ("racial" or
"nonracial")-I hope to be able to not only add to an understand-
ing of the anti-minority mindset, but also to raise the general issue
of racial mindsets. I hope to raise the racial-mindsets issue in a
way that is nonthreatening to the reader-whether he or she be
conservative (paleo- as well as neoconservative) or liberal (non-
practicing as well as a "good" liberal).
Finally, in part III I will explore the options available to mi-
nority candidates and to tenured minority law professors for deal-
ing with an anti-minority mindset. I will argue that verbal
confrontation rather than litigation is the best response to the
problem.
and Their Lives Today (1985) reaches the guarded conclusion that although being
Jewish is no longer the major impediment to happiness and worldly success in the
United States that it once was, anti-Semitism still exists in the United States, al-
ways threatening to change from its present covert state into a more overt state.
Racism and sexism are not only overt today, but also color and gender remain sig-
nificant barriers even to a middle class minority's or female's chances for happiness
and worldly success in America. See, e.g., Walter Leavy, What's Behind the Resur-
gence of Racism in America? Ebony, Apr. 1987, at 132; Samuel Freedman, Racial
Tension in New York is on Increase Despite Gains, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 1,
at 1, col. 1.
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I. Anti-Minority Mindset-Its Existence
The statistics showing the percentage of minority law profes-
sors, although not by themselves conclusive, are certainly proba-
tive of the presence of an anti-minority mindset. Of 6,660 full-time
law professors in the 1985-86 academic year only 433, or approxi-
mately 6.5%, were minorities.8 Worse, the number of minority law
professors who leave the profession is quite high. Of the 351 full-
time minority law professors teaching during the 1979-80 academic
year, only 201 remain in the profession today.9 "Minorities" are
defined as Afro-Americans, American Indians, Alaskan natives,
Asians, Pacific Islanders, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and
other Hispano-Americans.X0
These suspiciously dismal percentages cannot be explained
away by the arguments that not enough qualified minorities are
available for law teaching positions, or that minority candidates
who are considered for promotion or tenure are either incompe-
tent teachers or lack the ability to become competent teachers.
Many minority candidates for teaching positions have qualifica-
tions comparable to those of white candidates who are eventually
hired."1 Moreover, institutionalized defects in the law school per-
sonnel process rather than the supposed incompetency or poor
quality of minority candidates provide better explanations for the
low percentage of and high turnover rate for minority law
professors.
8. Memorandum 86-57, dated September 5, 1986 from Association of American
Law Schools Executive Director to Deans of Member Schools. The percentages of
full-time minority law teachers were approximately 6%, 6%, 5.8%, and 5.5% for the
1984-85, 1983-84, 1982-83, and 1981-82 academic years, respectively. Id.; Consultant's
Memorandum Q58182-37, James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
American Bar Association, to Deans of ABA-approved Schools, June 16, 1982 (here-
inafter Consultant's Memorandum). See also David Kaplan, Hard Times for Mi-
nority Law Professors, 7 Nat'l L.J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
9. These numbers are based on a comparison made by Professor Richard Del-
gado between the 1979-80 and 1985-86 editions of the Directory of Minority Law
Faculty. Letter from Professor Delgado dated June 30, 1986 (on file with Law &
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice). As Professor Delgado observes:
"Even discounting for missed names, the turnover-43% in six years-is remarka-
ble, especially in so young a group." Id.
10. See Consultant's Memorandum, supra note 8.
11. Even the AALS Registry, which does not contain all qualified minority can-
didates, in recent years has listed many minority applicants with law review, fed-
eral judicial clerkship, or prestigious law firm experiences.
Significantly, a recently issued report of the American Bar Association's Task
Force on Minorities in the Legal Profession did not find that qualified minorities
attempting to participate in legal education or in other areas of the profession were
in short supply. Rather, the report concluded that "lack of opportunity for minori-
ties in the legal profession persists." See 72 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 18. This au-
thor provided written testimony for the Task Force's study.
1987]
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Many tenured minority law professors have observed a
double standard in the law school personnel process. These minor-
ity law professors believe that their white male colleagues are in-
clined to more harshly judge minority candidates for appointment,
promotion, or tenure than they are willing to assess white male
candidates. This double standard, itself probative of the existence
of an anti-minority mindset, has caused some minority law profes-
sors to conclude that their white male colleagues seem to believe
only a "superstar" minority should be hired, promoted, or ten-
ured.12 The double standard is supported not only by the low per-
centage of, and high turnover rate for, minority law teachers, but
also by observations of female law professors who, not being en-
tirely immune from the double standard, have similarly noted that
law faculties are "only looking for the [female] superstars."'13
Another defect in the law school personnel process concerns
the added responsibilities and pressures of being a minority law
professor.14 Minority law professors, like their white counterparts,
are obligated to engage in full-time teaching, scholarship, and com-
mittee work. But unlike their white counterparts, minority law
professors face special professional burdens. These burdens in-
clude dealing with the unique problems of minority law students,
as well as the problems of white law students, minority commu-
nity organizations, and the minority underclass.15 Typically, these
burdens are not factored into the promotion or tenure process,
even though there is little reason to preclude law schools, espe-
cially private law schools, from doing so. 16 Relative to any claim of
incompetency or poor quality, this fact would seem to be a more
12. As Professor Bell has stated: "Thankfully or not, those folks [minority
superstars] are in very short supply." Sally Goldfarb, Education Without Represen-
tation, 9 Student Law., May 1981, at 11. See Symposium, The 1985 Minority Law
Teachers' Conference, 20 U.S.F.L. Rev. 383-576 (1986).
13. Gary Rivlin, Climbing the Legal Ladder: Some Kinds of Discrimination Die
Hard, Update, Fall 1981, at 49.
14. See, e.g., In Memoriam: C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1253, 1264-
67 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Roy Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors
Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome? 20 U.S.F.L. Rev. 419, 420-24 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Roy Brooks, Affirmative Action in Law Teaching, 14 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 15, 32-35 (1982). See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct.
1442 (1987), where in a 6-3 decision the Supreme Court held that, in response to a
racially or sexually imbalanced work force, public employers can use race or sex-
based preferences in hiring and promotion without fear of sustaining liability in a
"reverse discrimination" suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). Without a prior finding of discrimination, however, public
employers may sustain liability in an equal protection "reverse discrimination" suit.
See e.g., United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
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powerful explanation of why so few minorities are full-time law
professors today.
In addition to the statistics, one could point to the collective
experiences of tenured minority law professors to establish the
existence of an anti-minority mindset. These minority law profes-
sors have witnessed firsthand the inner workings of the law school
personnel process: the colleague who underscores the "underdevel-
oped" or "awkward" teaching style of a neophyte minority law
professor whose teaching style in reality suffers from a normal
lack of experience; the colleague who smugly announces, without
any firsthand knowledge or other hard evidence, that the minority
candidate unwittingly attempts to engage in classroom exercises
far beyond the latter's intellectual capacity; the colleague who is
pre-set to characterize minority scholarship as "simplistic," "de-
scriptive," or "functional"; or the colleague who looks askance at
minorities specializing in "race law" (i.e., civil rights). Evidence of
this sort could fill a book.17
It should be understood that I am not suggesting that all
white male law professors are anti-minority. Some give minority
matters high priority. The fact is, however, that from my observa-
tions and discussions with minority and white male and female
law professors, there is little doubt that some white male law
professors seem pre-set to react negatively toward minority candi-
dates for appointment, promotion, or tenure.1 8
Assuming some white law professors have an anti-minority
mindset, is this mindset a form of racism, and if so, which type?19
Is it an expression of something else, perhaps an expression of
what Professor Bell calls the "white self-interest phenomenon,"
and if so, which type?20 These questions are hardly insignificant.
If an anti-minority mindset is a variant of either "simple racism"
17. Evidence of this sort is, of course, largely undocumented, but continues to
appear in verbal accounts given at minority law teachers' conferences and on other
less formal occasions. Attempts are now being made to reduce the experiences of
minority law teachers to writing. See, e.g., letter from Professor Richard Delgado
of University of California Davis Law School dated June 30, 1986 (on file with Law
& Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice). Some idea of a minority law
teacher's quality of life can be gleaned from Symposium, supra note 12,; Richard
Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984).
18. The question of whether an anti-minority mindset exists is a difficult ques-
tion to raise because it is threatening to many law professors. If law schools are
serious about understanding the plight of minority faculty, increasing the number
of minority law professors, and discharging their social and educational obligations,
then the question of whether an anti-minority mindset exists must be raised. See
infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
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or the racially motivated version of the white self-interest phe-
nomenon, then it may taint the law school personnel process with
unlawful employment discrimination.21 If, on the other hand, an
anti-minority mindset is an expression of either "complex racism"
or the nonracial white self-interest phenomenon, then, although a
form of employment discrimination, it may not be capable of proof
under existing employment discrimination law. This is because
both racial mindsets probably fall short of the requisite motivation
to prove disparate treatment employment discrimination, and sta-
tistical evidence sufficient to prove disparate impact employment
discrimination would be difficult to obtain. 22
An anti-minority mindset, I believe, is at a minimum a form
of complex racism. It can also be a form of the nonracial white
self-interest phenomenon.
11. Anti-Minority Mindset-Its Substance
A. Anti-Minority Mindset as a Form of Racism
Racism is a difficult word to use. To suggest its presence is to
invite denial or anger, and to arouse intense controversy. Although
not entirely free of controversy, the following statements indicate
the difficulty one faces in attempting to understand the meaning
of racism:
Racism is one of those words that many people use, and feel
strongly about, but cannot define very clearly. Those who suf-
fer from racism usually interpret the word one way while
others interpret it quite differently. This ambiguity is possible
in part because the word refers to ideas that are very compli-
cated and hard to pin down. Yet, before we can fully under-
stand how racism works or how to combat its harmful effects
we must first try to define it clearly even though such an at-
tempt may be regarded as wrong by many.2 3
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines racism
as "a belief that race is the primary determinant of human traits
and capacities and that racial diferences produce an inherent supe-
riority of a particular race."24 The latter part of the definition
("inherent superiority") is the pejoritive sense in which the term is
most often used. That part of the definition makes it clear that
simply being cognizant of one's race or acting in accordance with
21. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-200e-17 (1982),
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and na-
tional origin.
22. See infra notes 67-124 and accompanying text.
23. Anthony Downs, Racism in America and How to Combat It, in Derrick
Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 87 (1973).
24. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 704 (1966).
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that awareness is not necessarily racism. Thus, "pride" in one's
Black heritage, or Irish ancestry, is not necessarily racism.
25
Although minority racism surely exists, the relationship be-
tween whites and minorities, especially Blacks, in this country has
been mainly influenced by white racism. 26 As Harry Ashmore, the
Pulitzer Prize-winning author states in his vivid epic, Hearts and
Minds: The Anatomy of Racism from Roosevelt to Reagan:
The concept of white supremacy had been exalted in the South
in defense of slavery, but it was by no means confined to the
region. Belief that whites were inherently superior to colored
people was embedded in the preceps of the European nations
that provided the original American settlers, and the immi-
grants who came later.27
Significantly, racism-a belief in white supremacy-is a mat-
ter of concern to minorities less because of the attitude it exhibits
than because of the effect it causes: harmful treatment. Since mi-
norities in the United States exercise less power than the white
majority, racism normally translates into physical or psychological
subordination of minorities. Thus, the major problem with racism,
from a minority viewpoint, is that it can cause subordination of
minorities.
Because the state of mind of one who perpetuates minority
subordination makes little difference to those who suffer from mi-
nority subordination-i.e., minorities-racism is defined by minori-
ties to include minority subordination. The persistent submission
or capitulation of important minority interests to the interests of
whites is a form of racism in the "hearts and minds" of minori-
ties.28 In many instances, the minority definition of racism actu-
ally goes beyond an occasional reference to minority
subordination. When the term "racism" is used in minority com-
munities, it often refers solely to minority subordination. The
harm is so discernible, so unmistakable, that the perpetrator's
state of mind (or, as in the case of societal discrimination, the per-
petrator's very existence) becomes irrelevant. Moreover, whether
the harm is backed by a racial animus does not change its exist-
ence or ameliorate the pain suffered by its victims. In short, when
individuals or institutions having "good" intentions engage in a
pattern or practice of granting low priority to matters of keen im-
25. Downs, supra note 23, at 88.
26. See, e.g., Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psycho-history (1970).
27. Harry Ashmore, Hearts and Minds: The Anatomy of Racism from Roosevelt
to Reagan 138 (1982).
28. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 41 (2d ed. 1982);
Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1342-44 (1986).
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portance to minorities-such as real equal access to quality jobs,
education, and housing-that is subordination and, hence, racism,
as far as minorities are concerned.2 9
In reality, then, "racism" can be defined in two distinct ways.
First, it can be defined in a formal, dictionary sense, with emphasis
on a perpetrator's state of mind, or on a particular source of harm,
namely, a belief in white supremacy (hereinafter referred to as
"racial formalism" or "simple racism"). Second, it can be defined
environmentally, or in terms of the harm produced, namely, per-
sistent exclusion from society's bounties (hereinafter referred to as
"racial subordination" or "complex racism").
Racial formalism, "far from being the simple delusion of a
bigoted and ignorant minority, is a set of beliefs whose structure
arises from the deepest levels of our lives-from the fabric of as-
sumptions we make about our world, ourselves, and others, and
from the patterns of our fundamental social activities." 30 If the
roots of racial formalism are planted deeply within the individual,
then the insecure individual seems to provide extraordinarily fer-
tile ground for the growth of racial formalism. White law profes-
sors who are very insecure about their abilities or jobs can easily
sprout racial formalism. Having no particular distinctions that
could establish them as leaders in their fields or as valuable assets
to their respective law schools, these individuals are but marginal
white males, as bland and as borderline as Sinclair Lewis' George
F. Babbitt.31 "[I]t is often the least powerful who are the greatest
bigots, while those at the top bask in tolerance and
magnanimity." 32
Racial subordination, the more sophisticated form of racism,
has little to do with intentional or conscious bias, although it can
also be deeply rooted in an individual or well entrenched within an
institution. Racial subordination arises from what writer Eudora
Welty once called "the moral style of a life," to which I would add
the moral style of institutional practices. In a word, racial subordi-
nation is largely the by-product of a soul taken over by racial indif-
ference or insensitivity.
29. It is much like a car that runs a traffic light. Whether the driver intended to
run the traffic light is immaterial to the ultimate question of whether he in fact ran
the traffic light and whether he in fact committed a traffic violation. Another anal-
ogy is in the area of employment discrimination law in which the Supreme Court
has defined employment discrimination both in terms of acts motivated by a racial
animus and acts unassociated with any such state of mind but which have a certain
impact on a protected class. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
30. Kovel, supra note 26, at 3.
31. Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt (1922).
32. Kovel, supra note 26, at 9.
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Several prominent minority law professors have recently sug-
gested that racial indifference or insensitivity, if not racial formal-
ism, not only exists among white law professors, but is increasing.
In an "Open Letter to Our Colleagues of the Majority Race,"
twenty-two minority law professors stated that most of them have
experienced indignities at the hands of their white colleagues. The
letter went on to state:
Moreover, the situation at many law schools seems to be
worsening, not improving. Responses to a letter sent to every
minority law professor confirmed our initial impression: the
professional lives of minorities of color teaching at the nation's
law schools have been deteriorating in recent years .... Many
of us sense decreasing institutional support and increasing
challenges to our legitimacy as teachers in the classroom. 33
It would be a large mistake to assume that law professors are too
well-informed, sophisticated, or intelligent to fall prey to racial
subordination or to play a childish game of racial formalism.
Recognizing that law professors are not immune from racism
and, as discussed in part I, that some law professors may have an
anti-minority mindset, are these racial mindsets coextensive? Is
an anti-minority mindset exhibited in the law school personnel
process simply an expression of racism? More specifically, is an
anti-minority mindset a form of racial subordination, racial formal-
ism, or both?
I believe that when a white law professor exhibits an anti-mi-
nority mindset in the personnel process, he or she is certainly
practicing racial subordination and may also be practicing overt or
covert racial formalism. The act of consistently inveighing against
or voting down qualified minority candidates is a clear act of racial
subordination. An anti-minority mindset and racial subordination
are identical mindsets.
An anti-minority mindset may also be an expression of racial
formalism. Reviewing minority applicants more harshly than
white applicants, being less tolerant of even small mistakes com-
mitted by minority teachers, and consistently offering negative
comment on the parade of minority candidates for law professor-
ships who come through the personnel process year after year at
least suggests the presence of racial formalism. A white law pro-
fessor who does this consistently may be acting upon at least a
33. Letter from Minority Law Professors to White Law Professors dated Au-
gust 1986 (on file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice). This
letter was inspired mainly by the Stanford Law School incident involving Professor




mild belief or suspicion that minority candidates or law professors
are subpar or inherently inferior law teachers. Some minority
candidates may not be as qualified as some white candidates based
on traditional selection criteria, 34 but to say that no minorities are
qualified or that most minorities are unqualified is racism pure
and simple.
In short, an anti-minority mindset can be a form of either
simple or complex racism. An anti-minority mindset is function-
ally indistinguishable from racial subordination because it results
in the persistent rejection of important minority interests in legal
education and employment. 35 It may also share the motivation be-
hind racial formalism-a belief in white supremacy. 36 More pre-
cisely, it can manifest itself as racial prejudice, itself a form of
simple racism,37 which means to make a "rash judgment" about a
racial minority or a member of such group. According to Theodore
Hesburgh's introduction to a study on racism in the United States,
"Fundamentally, [racial prejudice] involves passing detrimental or
negative judgment on a person or a group without sufficient evi-
dence .... [Racial prejudice] brings in its train fear, suspicion, re-
vulsion, hatred-all unfounded ... ."38
34. The stated criteria for granting tenure at most law schools are effective
teaching, substantial scholarship, and good university and community service. See,
e.g., Brooks, supra note 16, at 15.
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
37. See Prejudice U.S.A. (Charles Glock & Ellen Siegelman eds. 1969) [herein-
after Prejudice].
38. Theodore Hesburgh, Foreword, in Prejudice, supra note 37, at v-vi. Preju-
dice, or rash judgment, should be distinguished from erroneous judgment, and must
be understood to be an acquired attitude:
[Prejudice] is more pernicious and more inflexible. Shown factual
errors behind our other judgments, most of us will modify our views
willingly enough. Not so with prejudice. Show a bigot that his nega-
tive judgment is falsely founded, and he will quickly find two or three
other rationalizations for it in terms of his interests, his values, or
imagined or presumed "facts." Prejudice puts out roots in all direc-
tions. Destroy one; another is already burgeoning: Demonstrate that
Negroes are not biologically inferior, and they may be condemned as
lazy for not developing their talents. Prejudice, then, is not only
wrong judgment, it is inflexible judgment, almost always finding its
outlet in discriminatory action.
Yet, ironically, this poison of personal relations, this corrosive ele-
ment of our human nature, is not something with which we are born.
We learn it; we foster it; and we pass it on to others. It begins because
of a perception of difference--difference of color, language, religion,
social or economic situation, physical appearance, even sex. We follow
this perception of difference with an evaluation and a comparison:
What we have or are is the best, so anything different must be infer-
ior. Prejudice has led to and fed on war, oppression, conquest, slavery.
One thinks of the hostility between Jew and Arab, Occidental and Ori-
ental, Irishman and Englishman, German and Frenchman, or North-
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Though it may be possible to explain acts of racial subordina-
tion or racial formalism in nonracial terms by the assertion that
more qualified white applicants were selected, this is quite a differ-
ent issue. While the selection of more qualified white applicants
under these circumstances raises the issue of whether racial subor-
dination or racial formalism is justified, the selection does not alter
the fact that racism in some form has taken place.
The issue of whether the selection of more qualified white
candidates justifies either racial subordination or racial formalism
is really another way of asking whether the law school, as a matter
of institutional policy, should deem it necessary to have qualified
minorities on its faculty, even if it means occasionally passing up
more qualified white applicants. Assuming, arguendo, on the basis
of traditional law school hiring criteria, 39 a particular white appli-
cant is "more qualified"40 than a particular minority applicant
competing for the same position, there are compelling educational
and societal reasons for selecting the minority applicant.
The absence of minority law teachers, or their token presence
on a faculty, not only directly affects minority students by denying
them role models, it also has an adverse effect on the quality of
legal education for all students and on the professional develop-
ment of the law faculty. White students and white law professors
are denied the opportunity of understanding important legal
problems from a minority perspective. The issue of race has had
such an influence on doctrinal developments in many areas of the
erner and Southerner in a host of countries (Korea, Vietnam, the
United States, and many others).
Id. at vi.
39. See supra note 34.
40. It seems to me that the term "more qualified" should take into account the
realities of minority life, including the lingering effects of past racial discrimina-
tion. For example, a minority applicant who has overcome many obstacles in arriv-
ing at the professional level he or she now occupies may be "more qualified" for
law school teaching than a white applicant who started out in life with substantially
more advantages and, consequently, has more traditional credentials (law review,
judicial clerk, and so on) than the minority applicant. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971) ("History is filled with examples of men and women
who rendered highly effective service without the conventional badges of accom-
plishment in terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees.") Because of his or her per-
sonal struggles, the minority applicant may be a more motivated teacher or
assiduous scholar or may even be able to better empathize with the plight of strug-
gling law students. Also, I do not believe that anyone who takes cultural diversity
seriously can truthfully say that a qualified minority applicant is "less qualified"
than a white qualified applicant for a teaching position at a law school that is 95%
white and male. If cultural diversity counts for anything, it should make a differ-
ence in this type of case. Cf. Susan Westerberg Prager, President's Message-Colle-




law41 that its place in the well-rounded curriculum, which legal
41. I am grateful to my colleague, Edmund Ursin, for his valuable suggestions
regarding this line of argument. In constitutional law and civil rights law, issues of
race and slavery have played major roles in the judicial construction of several con-
stitutional amendments (e.g., 8th, 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments) and statutory
provisions (e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1982)). See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28; Wil-
liam Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, & Jesse Choper, Constitutional Law 592-625, 1245-
1379 (5th ed. 1980); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 705-862, 972-1103 (10th ed.
1980). The question of race has also influenced doctrinal developments in at least
the following other areas of law.
Civil Procedure: "Public Law litigation," sometimes called "institutional re-
form litigation," was created by the attempt of lower federal courts, especially dis-
trict courts, to enforce the school desegregation decree promulgated in Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II). See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice 1, 2-5 (1979). See gen-
erally David Louisell, Geoffrey Hazard, & Colin Tait, Pleading and Procedure 1083-
1147 (5th ed. 1983); Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1282-1302 (1976). The doctrine of intervention in both
federal and state courts has been further liberalized through application in public
law litigation and in cases involving a racial issue. See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Bustop v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 66 (1977). Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the landmark decision on United
States slavery, came before the Supreme Court on the issue of federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction-i.e., whether an emancipated slave is a citizen of a state for pur-
poses of federal diversity jurisdiction. 60 U.S. at 403. See generally Don
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics
(1978).
Constitutional Torts: Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)) allows any person
who is deprived of a federal statutory or constitutional right under color of state
law to sue the wrongdoer for damages. This burgeoning area of law traces its
source to section 1 of the Act of April 20, 1871 (also known as the Klu Klux Klan
Act of 1871), 17 Stat. 13 (1871). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). Sec-
tion 1983 has been heavily shaped by considerations of race. See, e.g., Kenneth Da-
vis, Constitutional Torts 211-78 (1984); Bell, supra note 28, at 220; Roy L. Brooks,
Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment Discrimina-
tion, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 258, 262-63, 269-71 (1977).
Property Law: Racial considerations have affected, among other things, the
right of disposition, see, e.g., Jones v. Alfred M. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); the
enforceability of private agreements, see, e.g., Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal.
3d 180, 640 P.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 129 (1982); and land use planning,
see, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). See generally John Cribbet & Corwin Johnson, Property Cases and
Materials 48-54, 76-83, 460-71, 1051-62 (5th ed. 1984).
Criminal Procedure: The issue of race has shaped such areas of criminal proce-
dure as the peremptory challenge, see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712
(1986); and voir dire, see, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986). See gener-
ally Yale Kamisar, Wayne LaFave, & Jerold Isreal, Modern Criminal Procedure
933-53, 1028, 1033, 1273-77, 1331-59 (5th ed. 1983).
Labor Relations Law: Race has played an important role in the law governing,
among other things, a union's primacy over the individual, see, e.g., Emporium Cap-
well Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975); the
union's duty of fair representation, see, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S.
192 (1944); and union elections, see, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
See generally Clyde Summers, Harry Wellington, & Alan Hyde, Labor Law 71-99,
373-87, 843-55 (2d ed. 1982).
Trusts and Estates: The issue of race has even played a role in the law concern-
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educators universally seek, cannot be seriously questioned. A mi-
nority legal perspective also helps to round out legal theories law
professors labor to develop in order to illuminate the current con-
dition and path of the law. Law and race, in short, engender cur-
riculum and faculty development no less than traditional legal
analysis, comparative legal analysis, clinical legal education, criti-
cal legal studies, law and economics, law and society, and a femi-
nist legal perspective. Underscoring the importance of what she
calls "collegial diversity," Dean Susan Westerberg Prager, presi-
dent of the Association of American Law Schools, has stated: "The
different perspectives of our colleagues can illuminate other areas
of research to give us new classroom direction. Our students de-
serve an education framed from many different perspectives and
the broader curriculum that comes from faculty members with dif-
ferent identities and interests."4 2
Some law students have recognized the important role minor-
ity law professors play in legal education. As one white student
leader has stated: "We want recognition of the premise that a
faculty ninety-six percent white and male does not provide an
equal education for all students and doesn't provide the best educa-
tion for any students, including white males."43
It is remotely possible that a "more qualified" white applicant
would have such a strong practical foundation in a minority per-
spective and would be sufficiently sensitive to the historical dimen-
sions of problems currently encountered by minorities that he or
she could competently raise and treat issues of race within the law
school community. Surely, however, this person's credibility in the
presentation of racial issues would not be as great (especially to
minority students) as a minority law professor's credibility-just as
a male's credibility in the presentation of feminist issues would not
be as great as a female's credibility. One who has lived the life of a
minority in this society for so long may not speak ex cathedra on
issues of race, but certainly does speak with a kind of wisdom and
sagacity that cannot be obtained vicariously.
The issue of who can best present a minority legal perspec-
tive goes beyond the matter of credibility. This issue also invokes
ing the creation and administration of charitable trusts. See, e.g., George Bogert &
Dallin Oaks, Law of Trusts 216-18 (1977).
Employment Discrimination: This area of law draws heavily upon cases in-
volving racial discrimination. See, e.g., Barbara Schlei & Paul Grossman, Employ-
ment Discrimination Law (2d ed. 1983); Michael Zimmer, Charles Sullivan, &
Richard Richards, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination (1983).
42. Prager, supra note 40, at 1.




important considerations of integrity of and domination within
democractic institutions. As Judge Wyzanski has stated:
To leave non-whites at the mercy of whites in the presentation
of non-white claims which are admittedly adverse to the
whites would be a mockery of democracy. Suppression, inten-
tional or otherwise, on the presentation of non-white claims
cannot be tolerated in our society .... In presenting non-white
issues non-whites cannot, against their will, be relegated to
white spokesmen, mimicking [BIlack men. The day of the
minstrel show is over.44
The social reasons for selecting the minority applicant over
the "more qualified" white applicant are equally compelling. A
law school, as a tax-exempt or "public benefit" institution and ma-
jor distiller of values in United States society, has a social obliga-
tion to maximize anti-discrimination values, including "the
expansion of employment opportunities for American [minori-
ties]."45 This obligation may even rise to the level of a moral duty.
Professor Torres of the University of Minnesota Law School ex-
pands on the social responsibility of law schools in the following
statement:
Both public and private law schools have a public obliga-
tion. Part of that public obligation is non-discrimination in
education and in hiring. I am suggesting, I recognize, an obli-
gation that goes beyond Title VII requirements. Yet, to deny
that such an obligation exists puts the burden on that person
to give contrary obligations which outweigh our moral duty as
lawyers, that is, as representatives of the law, to eliminate the
continuing subordination of one (or more) racial or ethnic
group to another .... [T]he legitimizing role that law schools
play in the creation and validation of law makes them central
players in the struggle to eliminate racism from our society. I
also think that such a claim can be made without exaggerating
the place of law schools in American society. 46
44. Western Addition Community Organization v. N.L.R.B., 485 F.2d 917, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 420 U.S. 50 (1975). Generally,
white law professors have not given adequate treatment to a minority perspective
on questions of race in the law. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 17; Robert M. O'Neil,
A Reaction to "The Imperial Scholar" and Professor Delgado's Proposed Solution, 3
Law & Inequality 255 (1985); Richard Delgado, The Author Replies, 3 Law & Ine-
quality 261 (1985).
45. Roy L. Brooks, Affirmative Action in Law Teaching, 14 Colum. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 15, 33 (1982).
46. Letter from Professor Gerald Torres dated June 13, 1986 (on file with Law
& Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice). The presence of minorities on a
law school faculty also "promptly operates to change the outward and visible signs
of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the process of
dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices." Lo-
cal 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 106 S. Ct.
3019, 3037 (1986), citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974).
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In addition to racism, an anti-minority mindset may be a vari-
ant of the white self-interest phenomenon. As will be seen in the
next section, this phenomenon is as old as racism in the United
States, but is more easily defined than racism.
B. Anti-Minority Mindset as a Form
of White Self-Interest
Professor Derrick Bell has defined the white self-interest
phenomenon in the following manner: "[E]ven civil rights laws
and decisions favoring [B]lacks occur only when the interests of
whites will be furthered-or at least not seriously threatened-
thereby."47 Blacks benefit only when whites in control of United
States institutions also benefit, or at least are not seriously
threatened by, action on behalf of Blacks. Blacks do not gain if
whites in control will experience significant pain.
This phenomenon, which seems applicable to all racial minor-
ities, can arise from two distinct nonracial beliefs. The first is that
white United States citizens, like all other United States citizens,
should use whatever power they possess to win social, political,
and economic advantage for themselves at every turn.48 The sec-
ond belief, held even by Benjamin Franklin and other abolition-
ists, 4 9 is that while other countries may belong to other races (e.g.,
Africa is a Black homeland), the United States-and, by extension,
its vital institutions-belongs to whites, always has, always will.50
Lincoln's grant of freedom to the slaves is a classic illustra-
tion of the white self-interest phenomenon. In response to New
York Herald Tribune editor Horace Greeley, one of many aboli-
tionists who urged the President to free the slaves, Lincoln stated
that his main objective in freeing the slaves was to save the Union,
not to eliminate the institution of slavery: "My paramount object
in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to
destroy slavery."51
Supreme Court decisionmaking in the area of civil rights may
be another classic illustration of the white self-interest phenome-
non. Some civil rights lawyers argue that even the liberal Warren
47. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 83 (1973).
48. See Theodore Cross, The Black Power Imperative (1985).
49. 1 do not mean to suggest that some abolitionists were not racist. The fact is
that some felt Blacks were inferior human beings. See, e.g., William H. Pease &
Jane H. Pease, Antislavery Ambivalence. Immediation, Expediency, Race, 17 Am.
Q. 682 (1965).
50. Slaughton Lynd, Slavery and the Founding Fathers, in Black History: A
Reappraisal 119 (Melvin Drimmer ed. 1968).




Court ruled in accordance with the white self-interest phenome-
non. For example, a staff attorney for the NAACP has argued
that during the Warren era, civil rights for Blacks advanced only
as far as was necessary to protect the image of whites. In discuss-
ing the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,52 the au-
thor stated:
In 1954, the Court was in a position to serve notice on
the American people that equality was an absolute right of all
citizens, that this right came before all other rights and that its
further subversion could not be tolerated. By taking this
stance, the Court could not only have gone a long way toward
relieving its conscience but it could also have established itself
as a true constitutional court, dedicated to an impartial search
for just principles, irrespective of race.
Instead, the Court chose to act in the manner of the
practical reformer. Rather than ordering sweeping desegrega-
tion, it ordered another hearing. A year later, the Court ruled
that the South did not have to desegregate its schools immedi-
ately, it merely had to do so "with all deliberate speed." Never
in the history of the Supreme Court had the implementation
of a constitutional right been so delayed or the creation of it
put in such vague terms. The Court hereby made clear that it
was a white court which would protect the interests of white
America in the maintenance of stable institutions.
In essence, the Court considered the potential damage to
white Americans resulting from the diminuation of privilege
as more critical than continued damage to the underprivileged.
The Court found that public reasons-the offense to white
sensibilities--existed to justify the delay in school desegrega-
tion. Worse still, it gave the primary responsibility for achiev-
ing educational equality to those who had established the
segregated institutions.
This decision to delay integration and ignore racially dis-
criminatory mechanisms was more shameful than the Court's
19th-century monuments to apartheid. For, by the mid-20th
century, there was no basis on which the Court's nine edu-
cated men could justify a segregated society. Scientific racism
had been discredited and Americans had been exposed to the
full implications of racism in Nazi Germany. 53
Two major questions arise from an understanding of the
52. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
53. Lewis Steel, Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct.
13, 1968, at 56. Recent disclosures by Philip Elman, a former law clerk to Justice
Felix Frankfurter who served as a Justice Department civil rights lawyer at the
time Brown was pending before the Supreme Court, squarely support Mr. Steel's
claim concerning the Court's "with all deliberate speed" ruling. That ruling served
to allay the fear several justices had that immediate school desegregation would re-
sult in virtual warfare across the South. Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Of-
fice, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: an Oral History,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 817, 827-30 (1987); see also, Time, Apr. 6, 1987, at 71.
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white self-interest phenomenon. First, is an anti-minority mindset
an expression of the white self-interest phenomenon? Second, is
the white self-interest phenomenon a form of racism (simple or
complex)?
An anti-minority mindset can be a variant of the white self-
interest phenomenon. Within the context of the law school per-
sonnel process, an anti-minority mindset can vindicate at least two
interests of white law professors. The first relates to marginal
white males on the faculty.54 Minority candidates pose a direct
threat to this segment of the faculty, who have little power in vy-
ing for scarce law school resources. Rejecting minority candidates,
especially at the tenure stage, reduces the competition for white
males who are not at the top of the pecking order in terms of
merit-pay increases, travel funds, and other scarce administrative
resources. Marginal white males are vulnerable in another more
threatening manner. Feeling an acute financial pinch engendered
by recent reductions in student applications,55 some law schools
have talked openly about laying off even tenured faculty. If a law
school has to decide whether to lay off either a tenured minority
law professor or a tenured white professor, a marginal white male
seems less likely to prevail under the weight of affirmative action
considerations than a white male who has made a more substantial
contribution to the law school.
Another white self-interst that may be vindicated by the anti-
minority mindset concerns the law school's reputation. A law
school's reputation is like goodwill in a business-it is a vital asset,
without which the enterprise could not thrive.56 Some white law
professors may believe it is an unfortunate fact of life in our still-
racist society that a law school's reputation-national, regional, or
local-would suffer if "too many" minorities were hired or re-
ceived tenure. A few minority law professors will not adversely
affect a law school's reputation. Indeed, not unlike the proper
amount of leverage on a corporation's balance sheet,57 a law
school's image of fairness, openness, and diversity is enhanced by
having a few minority law professors. But it would be a cultural
anomaly to imagine the most prestigious law faculties in the
54. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
55. According to the American Bar Association, law school applications have
dropped 25% in the last four years. San Diego Tribune, Oct. 22, 1986, at C5, cols. 2-
3. See also David Kaplan, Enrollment Continues to Plunge: Why is Student Inter-
est Waning? 7 Nat'l L.J., April 8, 1985, at 4, col. 2; Sarah Hoban, Law School Go-
Around: Tuition Up, Applicants Down, 13 Student Law. 12 (Sept. 1984).
56. See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin Chirelstein, Corporate Finance 286-88
(2d ed. 1979).
57. See, e.g., id. at 317-23.
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United States as 40%, 50%, or 60% minority, even if minorities
were clearly the most qualified law teachers.58
An anti-minority mindset, in short, can be an expression of
the white self-interest phenomenon when it arises from either or
both basic beliefs underpinning that phenomenon: (1) white indi-
viduals, as all United States citizens, should use whatever power
they possess to win social, political, and economic advantage at
every turn;5 9 (2) United States institutions, in the final analysis,
belong to whites.60 Marginal white males may be motivated by the
first belief more than the second, and those white male professors
who are concerned with the law school's reputation may be moti-
vated by the second belief more than the first.
The second question (namely, is the white self-interest phe-
nomenon a form of racism?), can be understood as an attempt to
bring all three racial mindsets-anti-minority, racism, and white
self-interest-together. To the extent the white self-interest phe-
nomenon results in persistent exclusion of minorities from law
faculties, it is functionally indistinguishable from complex ra-
cism. 61 In this sense, an anti-minority mindset and the white self-
interest phenomenon both partake of racism defined as racial
subordination.62
Whether the white self-interest phenomenon is also nothing
more than a sophisticated form of racial formalism is a most signif-
icant question. An affirmative answer would, of course, mean that
an anti-minority mindset, regardless of the racial perspective from
which it is considered, is an expression of racism.63
While it is clearly possible that a belief in white supremacy
can motivate white self-interest, the nexus between the two is not
absolute. As noted earlier, two distinct nonracial beliefs can moti-
vate or support the white self-interest phenomenon.6 4 These non-
racial beliefs can provide stronger motivation for white selfish
behavior than racial formalism, because they are intellectually
stronger than simple racism and are otherwise sufficient to give
whites the benefits they seek by acting selfishly toward minorities.
58. White law professors who reject minority applicants in order to protect a
law school's reputation give support to societal racial discrimination. The desire to
protect a law school's reputation, because it supports societal racial discrimination,
may be more racial than nonracial. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
63. At least one student of racism has suggested that the white self-interest
phenomenon and racism are the same thing. See Ashmore, supra note 27, at 138.
64. See supra notes 48-49, 59-60 and accompanying text.
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Hence, the white self-interest phenomenon does not have to be
motivated by simple racism in order to benefit whites.
Another reason for concluding that the white self-interest
phenomenon is not merely a sophisticated form of racial formalism
has to do with the nature of the nonracial beliefs. These beliefs, or
motivations, seem genuinely nonracial. The belief that individuals
should promote themselves is essentially based on a personal-max-
imizing principle, and the belief that the United States belongs to
whites is based on white possessiveness. Neither rationale is ex-
plicitly based on a belief in white supremacy. 65
Correctly understood, the personal-maximizing principle is
an individual strategy. Using a variety of means, the individual
seeks only to maximize personal gain. To the extent that the
means chosen include using racist commentary or other racist acts,
the individual, or "maximizer," avoids racial formalism if he or she
is not a true believer in white supremacy. The maximizer does
not, however, avoid racial subordination, for which he or she
should be condemned as morally and socially irresponsible as well
as "racist." In short, the true maximizer is interested only in indi-
vidual supremacy, not white supremacy.
White possessiveness, like personal maximization, is not nec-
essarily motivated by a belief in the inherent superiority of whites.
It can be based on one or both of the following nonracial beliefs.
First, a kind of "we've got ours; it doesn't matter how we got it, we
mean to keep it" line of thinking. Second, notwithstanding the so-
called "American melting pot" and the social reality that defines it
as a polyglot, multiracial society, power in this society is mainly in
the hands of white males, and this is how it should be, because this
country was built by white males more than any other group.
Thus, the whiteness of United States institutions, cultures, and so-
ciety is no accident of history, and it is not unjustified.
Even if predicated on genuinely nonracial beliefs, the white
self-interest phenomenon can be faulted for its unrestrained ma-
joritarianism. This country and her institutions are not the exclu-
sive property of the majority. Moreover, the right of the majority
to maximize their power is limited. Majoritarianism is limited not
only by constitutional guarantees 66 but also by the moral principle
implicit in those guarantees that the powerful shall not use its lib-
65. It is difficult to determine when the white self-interest phenomenon is mo-
tivated by a racial or nonracial belief. In the context of employment discrimination
litigaton, moreover, proving racial motivation is normally difficult. See infra notes
67-124 and accompanying text.
66. E.g., U.S. Const., amends. 1-10, 13, 14, 15.
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erty to destroy liberty for the powerless. The powerful may not
invoke a right to destroy liberty for the powerless.
It may be difficult for minority candidates and minority law
professors to do anything concrete about an anti-minority mindset
among white law professors without the support of other white
law professors. Litigation is doubtful at best. The only effective
means of redress may be for tenured minority law professors, with
the support of enlightened white colleagues, to verbally confront
nonsupportive white law professors at faculty meetings. I develop
these points next.
III. Anti-Minority Mindset-What Can Be Done About It?
Precisely what can be done to challenge an anti-minority
mindset may turn on a determination of its substance. If the anti-
minority mindset is in substance complex racism or the nonracial
white self-interest phenomenon, then the injured minority candi-
date or law professor could not seriously contemplate filing an em-
ployment discrimination lawsuit against the law school under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,67 the nation's major employment
discrimination law. This is because the lawsuit necessarily would
be based on racial subordination-in other words, on the effects
rather than on the intent of the law schools' employment prac-
tices 68-which is actionable under Title VII only if supported by
sufficient statistical evidence.69 There are probably too few minor-
ity candidates who apply to specific law schools during a given
time frame to create a minority applicant pool large enough to be
statistically significant. 70 The even smaller number of minority
law teachers at individual law schools creates a greater statistical
problem for the minority teacher denied promotion or tenure.71
A more appropriate response to racial subordination would be
one not involving litigation. Such a response might be initiated by
tenured minority law professors. It could include verbally con-
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
68. This would be the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination.
See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977).
70. While the Supreme Court has not stated how large a sample must be in or-
der to be statistically significant, it is clear that a Title VII plaintiff must prove that
an employer's selection criteria for hiring or promotion creates a "significant" racial
disparity. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
71. For a detailed discussion of the use of statistics to prove disparate impact,
see, e.g., Schlei & Grossman, supra note 41, at 80-161; Elaine Shoben, Differential
Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 793 (1978).
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fronting white colleagues to try to change the way they think
about the relative qualifications of minority and white applicants,
the concept of quality legal education (including curriculum and
faculty development), and the social obligations of law schools.72
Tenured minority law professors certainly should attempt to raise
the faculty's awareness about the existence and substance of an
anti-minority mindset in the personnel process, and about racial
mindsets in general.
If, on the other hand, an anti-minority mindset is a form of
racial formalism or the racial variety of the white self-interest
phenomenon, then an appropriate response would be for tenured
minority law professors, with the support of sympathetic white
colleagues, to verbally confront racist white colleagues. The pur-
pose of verbal confrontation in this case, however, is not enlighten-
ment-that probably will not happen 73-but vindication of truth,
fairness, and human dignity. Verbal confrontation will also make
it difficult for the offending colleagues to accomplish their objec-
tives, because they will be forced to openly defend the merits of
their statements and behavior.
Title VII litigation would also be a logical response to a racist
mindset. It would not, however, be an intelligent response. A bet-
ter response is for the injured minority candidate to sue the law
school under liberal state employment discrimination law.74 Title
VII affords little protection of minority employment rights in the
law school personnel process and, consequently, should be avoided
by minority candidates.75 Title VII may be a moribund law when it
comes to redressing sophisticated forms of employment discrimina-
tion, such as we have in the 1980s.76 Surprisingly, this has less to
do with the fact that Title VII was born at a time when most forms
of racism were overt 77 or with the transaction costs attentive upon
complex litigation generally 7s than with recent Supreme Court
72. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 30, 38, and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985); Marjorie
Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act: A Via-
ble State Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 34 Hastings L. Rev. 1055 (1983).
75. Tenured minority professors will not have standing to sue where the injury
runs to a minority candidate.
76. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High
Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (1982); Andrea Waintroob, The Developing Law of
Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 45 (1979).
77. For an excellent discussion of Title VII legislative history, see Francis Vaas,
Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 431 (1966).
78. E.g., payment of attorneys' fees up front, delay in litigation, and protracted
litigation. See, e.g,, Edward Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense
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and lower federal court constructions of Title VII. Recent federal
cases have made it difficult for Title VII plaintiffs to win their
cases. To illustrate this point, I will discuss two areas of Title VII
law that present serious problems for minority candidates proceed-
ing against an anti-minority mindset: proof of racial motivation
and establishment of a legal nexus between such state of mind and
the harmful act. Before embarking upon this discussion, it may be
helpful to begin with a brief explanation of Title VII's concepts of
discrimination.
Although Congress made employment discrimination on the
basis of race,7 9 color,80 sex,81 religion,82 or national origin8 3 illegal
under Title VII, it did not endeavor to define the word "discrimi-
nation." This was left to the courts.
Responding to this challenge, the Supreme Court has ren-
dered two distinctly different definitions of employment discrimi-
nation: disparate treatment (requiring proof of racial motivation)8 4
and disparate impact (requiring no such proof).8 5 Both concepts
were defined succinctly by the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States:8 6
"[D]isparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present
case is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences
in treatment. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitdn
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256-266. Undoubtedly dispa-
rate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13088
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("What the bill does ... is
of Perspective, 70 F.R.D. 212 (1976); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 7 FEP 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 522
F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. Although an impermissible basis listed in § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1982), color is generally treated as indistinguishable from race. See EEOC Dec. 72-
0454 (9/15/71) (unreported EEOC finding of reasonable cause where light-skinned
"white-looking" Black was selected over dark-skinned, Negroid-featured Black).
81. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
82. In addition to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religious observ-
ances, practices, and beliefs, Title VII requires employers to accommodate work re-
quirements to religious practices. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 (1977).
83. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
84. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
85. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
86. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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simply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in
denying employment. It provides that men and women shall
be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as Catho-
lic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens,
not as colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States").
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from
claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve em-
ployment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not re-
quired under a disparate-impact theory. Compare, e.g., Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-432, with McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-806. See generally, B.
Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1-12
(1976); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1972). Either theory may, of course, be ap-
plied to a particular set of facts.
8 7
A minority candidate suing a law school on the basis of an
anti-minority mindset theory, in which the claim is in substance
one of intentional racial discrimination, would proceed under the
disparate treatment definition of employment discrimination.
88
This being an individual case of disparate treatment rather than a
class action, 8 9 proof of the requisite state of mind can be made us-
ing direct, smoking gun evidence, 90 which is rarely available to-
day, 91 or inferentially using circumstantial evidence. 92 In either
87. 431 U.S. at 335, n.15.
88. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text for other reasons disparate
impact discrimination would not work.
89. In a disparate treatment class action, plaintiff must establish that defendant
regularly and purposefully treated his or her protected class less favorably than the
dominant group, or, in other words, that disparate treatment was not an isolated act
but a systemic practice. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Such disparate treatment is normally proven by statistical evidence, see Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood School District v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); but can also be proven by testimony from numerous in-
dividuals, see International Bhd of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); or by the adop-
tion of broad employment practices or policies based on explicit impermissible
criteria, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
90. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 7 FEP 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 522
F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
91. See, e.g., Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Ore. 1970),
aff'd 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974).
92. Although statistics can be used under certain circumstances in individual
disparate treatment cases, see Stuart Bompey & Barry Saltman, The Role of Statis-
tics in Employment Discrimination Litigation-A University Perspective, 9 J.
Coll. & Univ. L. 263, 271 (1981), most individual disparate treatment cases are estab-
lished without the use of statistics. In McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802,
the Supreme Court set forth the primary non-statistical method of establishing a
prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence. It must be proven:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
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case, defendant must be given an opportunity to rebut plaintiff's
prima facie case by showing a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son" for plaintiff's treatment.93 If defendant meets its burden of
proof, plaintiff must be given an opportunity to show that defend-
ant's reason is nothing more than a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.94
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,95 the
Supreme Court let stand a devastating problem of proof for Title
VII plaintiffs. The Court reaffirmed earlier Supreme Court rul-
ings that defendant's burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for plaintiff's treatment is only a burden of
production, not one of persuasion. 96 In the absence of smoking
gun evidence or an unsophisticated defendant, the Court's holding
makes it easy for a defendant to win on the merits of a disparate
treatment case. Defendant can rebut the prima facie case on the
basis of admissible but untrue evidence as to its true motivation.
Plaintiff, not being privy to defendant's thinking, is left with the
near impossible task of persuading the trier of fact that defend-
ant's stated motivation was untrue.9 7 This burden is unfair when
one considers that defendant is in the best possible position to
know the true reasons for the action taken against plaintiff. In the
law school personnel process, the minority candidate is going to be
the last person to know, or have the resources to try to find out,
the real reasons members of the personnel committee or tenured
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
93. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
94. Id. at 804-05. See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442,
1451 (1987).
95. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
96. Id. at 252-56. "The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actu-
ally motivated by the proferred reasons .... It is sufficient if the defendant's evi-
dence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff." Id. at 254-55. See also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25
(1978) (employer's burden to dispel the adverse inference created by plaintiff's
prima facie case is merely to "articulate" some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the action, and not to prove the absence of discriminatory motive); Furnco Con-
str. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (employer's burden in rebutting prima
facie case is to show that he based his decision on a legitimate consideration, and
not on an illegitimate one such as race). Thus, the ultimate burden of persuasion as
to the issue of discrimination always remains with the plaintiff. See generally Mi-
guel Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treat-
ment Cases, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1129 (1980).
97. See, e.g., Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff fails to prove pretext).
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faculty voted against him or her.98 Adding the fact that courts
normally allow the use of subjective reasons in articulating a "le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" in college and university
meetings,99 it seems unrealistic to expect that a minority candidate
will be able to prove intent.
Even if the minority candidate is able to prove the intent ele-
ment of disparate treatment, he or she will also have to prove cau-
sation. Given the probability that the law school will meet its
Burdine burden by producing more than a scintilla of evidence
probative of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the mi-
nority candidate's treatment, the causation question will probably
arise in the murky context of "mixed-motive cases."1 °
A mixed-motive case is one in which both permissible and
impermissible factors play a role in the employer's conduct. 10 ' A
typical example of a mixed-motive case is where a minority appli-
cant is denied a job both because he or she is unqualified and the
employer is racist. Though Title VII prohibits discrimination "be-
cause of" race or color, does mixed-motive discrimination consti-
tute discrimination "because of" the applicant's race or color?
Unfortunately, Title VII does not define the causal connector "be-
cause of." Also, the causation issue has not been explicitly decided
by the Supreme Court, and the lower federal courts remain di-
vided on how to resolve it. I shall begin with the statute's treat-
ment of causation.
Although Title VII does not define the causal connector "be-
cause of," Title VII does suggest two approaches to mixed-motive
cases. The first is presented in section 2000e2(a)(2), which prohib-
its acts that "tend to deprive" individuals of employment opportu-
nities.102 This section seems to suggest that an impermissible
factor (such as racial prejudice) cannot be among the factors moti-
98. Referring to the use of fairness as a principle on which to allocate the bur-
den of proof, Professor Cleary has stated, 'The nature of a particular element may
indicate that evidence relating to it lies more within the control of one party, which
suggests the fairness of allocating that element to him." Edward Cleary, Presum-
ing and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1959).
Thus, placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff regarding defendant's "legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason" is hardly compelling from a fairness perspective.
99. See, e.g., Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 648 F.2d 61, 66 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981) (subjective reasons for tenure denial);
Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1156 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S.
984 (1978) (reasons given for inadequate teaching ability were arguably subjective).
100. For a detailed discussion of the mixed-motive cases, see Mark Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Per-
spective, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 292 (1982).
101. Thus, the mixed-motive issue in individual disparate treatment cases will
normally arise at the pretext stage. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(2)(198 2 ).
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vating an employer's actions. This approach to mixed-motive cases
is called the "taint standard." If an employer's action is tainted by
an impermissible factor (specifically, "race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin"),oS then it is unlawful employment discrimination
under Title VII. The taint standard, also called the "discernible
factor" standard (the personnel decision is unlawful if race, for ex-
ample, was a discernible factor in the decision),104 would seem to
be consistent with the broad congressional design of Title VII-
namely, "to eliminate... discrimination in employment based on
race, color, [sex,] religion, or national origin."10 5
Another section of Title VII, however, suggests a different
approach to causation in mixed-motive cases. Section 2000e5(g),1o6
patterned after the National Labor Relations Act's 0 7 remedial
provisions, 0 8 sets forth the type of relief a prevailing plaintiff may
receive under Title VII. The last sentence reads:
No order of the court shall require the admission or rein-
statement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hir-
ing, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such indi-
vidual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was
refused employment or advancement or was suspended or dis-
charged for any reason other than discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of
section 2000e-3(a) of this title.'0 9
Although this sentence would seem to address only the question of
remedy, as does all of section 2000e-5(g), the entire section re-
sulted from the adoption of an amendment to Title VII. The
amendment's purpose was to specify to a federal district court that
a Title VII violation could be found only when race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin was the sole motivation behind the em-
ployer's action.110 This is sometimes called the "sole factor" stan-
dard--causation is established in a Title VII case only when the
103. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 36 FEP 713 (8th Cir. 1984).
105. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2391, 2401. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979).
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1982 & Supp. I 1983).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
108. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419, n.11 (1975).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
110. Congressman Emmanual Celler, who introduced the amendment, stated:
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the amendment is to specify cause. Here
the court, for example, cannot find any violation of the act which is
based on facts other-and I emphasize "other"-than discrimination
on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin. The dis-
charge might be based, for example, on incompetence or a morals
charge or theft, but the court can only consider charges based on race,
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employment decision is based solely on one of the impermissible
criteria. Under the "sole factor" standard, plaintiff can never pre-
vail in a mixed-motive case because, by definition, an impermissi-
ble criterion was not the sole factor behind the employer's action.
Federal courts have not been any more definitive than Con-
gress in resolving the causation problem in mixed-motive individ-
ual disparate treatment cases. 11 ' In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,112 the Supreme Court seemed to adopt the taint standard
suggested in section 2000e-2(a)(2).113 The Court stated that, "In
the implementation of . . [personnel] decisions, it is abundantly
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise." 114 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co.,115 the Supreme Court suggested that the proper causation
standard may be somewhere between the liberal taint standard
and the stricter sole factor standard. Responding to plaintiff's
claim that the employer's "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
offered for their discharge was mere pretext,116 the Court said:
The use of the term "pretext" in this context does not
mean, of course, that the Title VII plaintiff must show that he
would have in any event been rejected or discharged solely on
the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged deficien-
cies .... [N]o more is required to be shown than that race was
a "but for" cause. 117
McDonald thus adopts a "but-for" causation standard. Title
VII is violated when plaintiff shows that but for the use of an im-
permissible criterion (race, color, sex, and so on), the adverse per-
sonnel decision would not have been made. The but-for standard
is sometimes called either the "dominant taint," "dominant fac-
tor," or "determining factor" standard (the personnel decision is
unlawful if race, for example, was the dominant or determining
factor in the decision) 1 8 or the "same decision" standard,119
"which would uphold personnel action based in part on race if
color, religion, or national origin. That is the purpose of this
amendment.
110 Cong. Rec. 2567 (1964).
111. For a discussion of causation in systemic disparate treatment cases, see, e.g.,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); East Texas
Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
112. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
113. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
114. 411 U.S. at 801.
115. 427 U.S. at 273 (1976).
116. See supra text accompanying note 94.
117. 427 U.S. at 282, n.10.




merit principles alone would have led to the same result."120
Like the Supreme Court and Congress, the lower federal
courts have not agreed on a causation standard. They seem to be
split between the taint and but-for standards.121 One scholar, how-
ever, has concluded that the lower federal courts are moving to-
ward stricter standards of causation. 122
In short, assuming the defendant law school is able to meet
its burden of protection under Burdine,123 the success of the mi-
nority plaintiff's anti-minority mindset action may depend on
which causation standard the court applies. Plaintiff will have an
easier time establishing a Title VII violation in jurisdictions em-
ploying the taint standard than in jurisdictions employing the
stricter but-for or sole factor standards.124
Conclusion
Minority law professors have sensed for some time that some-
thing is amok in United States law schools when it comes to hir-
ing, promoting, and granting tenure to minority candidates. The
statistics, as dismal as they are, 125 do not tell the entire story.
They do not tell us, for example, how many potential minority
candidates have not applied for teaching positions because of the
reputation of United States law schools for hostility toward minor-
ity candidates, or why minority candidates do so badly in the per-
sonnel process.
By broaching the notion of an anti-minority mindset, I have
attempted to provide an answer to this question, although not by
any means the only answer. There are simply too many minority
candidates with qualifications too similar to many white male can-
didates who do not do as well as the latter for one to seriously sug-
gest that the dearth of minority law professors, especially tenured
minority law professors, is entirely due to a lack of qualifications.
Nor can one say that in every case the problem is simply one of
Jim-Crow style racism. There is more to the problem than these
now-traditional explanations, and law schools must look for new
insights if they sincerely hope to deal effectively with the problem
120. Brodin, supra note 100, at 296.
121. See id. at 308-10 (cases collected). See also Bibbs v. Block, 36 FEP 713 (8th
Cir. 1984).
122. See Brodin, supra note 100.
123. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
124. This assumes, of course, that plaintiff is able to show that an anti-minority
mindset is in substance racial prejudice. See supra notes 23-66 and accompanying
text.
125. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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and its adverse effects on the quality of legal education.126
If part of the problem is engendered by an anti-minority
mindset among some white law professors who are verbally ag-
gressive and, by appealing to merit principles, forceful enough to
persuade their colleagues to reject minority candidates, then, un-
fortunately, minority candidates or tenured minority law profes-
sors have limited choices. Litigation is doubtful at best. Verbal
confrontation at faculty meetings, which will surely shorten the
life of the lone and stressed-out tenured minority faculty mem-
ber, 127 may be the only realistic way to contain white law profes-
sors who seem habitually hostile to minority candidates, and who
attempt to hide their true intentions behind a smoke screen of
meritocracy.
126. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
127. The late C. Clyde Ferguson's over-burdened professional life is typical of
many minority law professors. See In Memoriam: C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., 97 Harv.
L. Rev. 1253, 1264-67 (1984).

